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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s appellate decision affirming the 
magistrate court’s order granting Ivan Pettit’s motion to suppress evidence 
obtained during a DUI investigation.  
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
 
In May 2015, Pettit was traveling south on Highway 95/Highway 8 near 
Moscow, Idaho.1  (R., p.131; Tr., p.15, Ls.2-11; Defendant’s Exhibits A, B.)  Pettit 
approached a controlled intersection.  (R., p.132; Tr., p.15, Ls.2-11; p.18, Ls.13 – 
p.19, L.24; State’s Exhibits 3-7.)  A driver may approach this intersection near 
Moscow by one of three lanes.  (R., p.132; Tr., p.18, Ls.15-23; State’s Exhibit 3.)  
From the left lane, a driver may either continue straight onto Highway 8, or turn 
left onto a local road.  (R., p.132; Tr., p.17, Ls.14-22; State’s Exhibits 3-7; 
Defendant’s Exhibits A, B.)  From both the center and right lanes, a driver is only 
permitted to turn right and to continue on Highway 95.  (R., p.132; State’s 
Exhibits 3-7.)  These lanes are controlled by traffic signs and a traffic signal that 
displays a green right-turn arrow when a driver is permitted to turn right.  (R., 
p.132; Tr., p.16, L.22 – p.20, L.7; State’s Exhibits 2-7.) 
Idaho State Police Sergeant Clint Baldwin observed Pettit enter the 
intersection from the center lane and turn right without signaling.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-
11.)  Sgt. Baldwin effectuated a traffic stop based upon Pettit’s failure to signal.  
                                            
1 At some unspecified point prior to the intersection, Highway 95 South is also 
designated as Jackson Street.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.2-11; p.20, Ls.14-22; R., p.132 n.1; 
Defendant’s Exhibit A.)   
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(Tr., p.20, L.23 – p.21, L.8; p.23, L.16 – p.24, L.2.)  Pettit had glassy eyes, slightly 
slurred speech, and admitted to drinking alcohol prior to driving.  (R., p.17.)  Pettit 
then failed field sobriety tests, was arrested, and provided breath samples 
measuring a BAC of .126 and .119.  (Id.)  Additionally, Pettit’s driving privileges 
were suspended at the time of the arrest due to a previous DUI conviction.  (Id.)  
The state charged Pettit with second-offense misdemeanor driving under the 
influence and driving without privileges.  (R., p.26.) 
Pettit filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the DUI 
investigation.  (R., pp.34-45.)  Pettit argued that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop his vehicle, and that I.C. § 49–808(1), the statute upon which 
the stop was based, was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him and the 
circumstances of this case.  (Id.)  Following a hearing, the magistrate court 
granted Pettit’s motion to suppress.  (R., p.69; Tr., p.64, L.8 – p.70, L.25.)   
In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court affirmed the 
suppression order.  (R., pp.131-146.)  The district court concluded that Sgt. 
Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop because I.C. § 49–808(1) did 
not require Pettit to signal from the turn-only lane, from which Pettit continued to 
travel on Highway 95 after the turn.  (R., pp.134-141.)  The district court rejected 
the state’s alternative argument that, even if Sgt. Baldwin misapplied I.C. § 49–
808(1) and lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop, that this mistake of law was 
objectively reasonable and that suppression was thus not required.  (R., pp.143-
145.)  Because the district court affirmed the suppression order on the ground 
that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop, it did not reach the 
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issue of whether I.C. § 49–808(1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
Pettit.  (R., pp.142-143.)  The state timely appealed.  (R., pp.150-153.)   
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in concluding that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop Pettit’s vehicle for failing to signal at the intersection? 
 
2. Is suppression of evidence the appropriate remedy when the statute upon 
which the underlying seizure was based is subsequently declared 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the suspect? 
 
3. Even if Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Pettit’s vehicle, 
was this mistake of law objectively reasonable, and is suppression 
therefore unnecessary?  
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
The District Court Erred In Concluding That Sgt. Baldwin Lacked Reasonable 
Suspicion To Stop Pettit’s Vehicle For Failing To Signal At The Intersection 
 
A. Introduction 
 In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court affirmed the 
magistrate court’s order suppressing evidence obtained from Sgt. Baldwin’s DUI 
investigation of Pettit following a traffic stop.  (R., pp.131-146.)  The district court 
concluded that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop because 
I.C. § 49–808(1) did not require Pettit to signal from a turn-only lane, where Pettit 
continued to travel on Highway 95 after the turn.  (R., pp.134-141.)  The district 
court erred because the plain language of the signal requirement of I.C. § 49–
808(1) does not contain any exceptions that removed Pettit’s duty to signal under 
the circumstances of this case.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s 
decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  The 
appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id.  
 The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
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trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
The meaning and effect of a statute is a question of law over which the 
appellate courts exercise free review.  State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 
850, 852 (2001). 
 
C. Sgt. Baldwin Possessed Reasonable Suspicion That Pettit Violated 
I.C. § 49–808(1) By Failing To Signal 
 
“A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).  
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).  
However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable 
cause, are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.  Royer, 
460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210.  “An officer may 
also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.”  
Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411 (1981)).  Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
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evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
before the time of the stop.  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).   
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted 
according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will 
not resort to principles of statutory construction.  State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 
360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 
578, 581 (1996).  “When a statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in 
accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing 
court may not apply rules of construction.”  State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 
191, 824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted).  In Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 
(2011), the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho appellate courts do not have 
the authority to modify unambiguous statutes even if it concludes that construing 
the statute as written would produce “absurd results.” 
Idaho Code § 49–808(1) provides: 
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a 
vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a 
highway unless and until the movement can be made with 
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
 
Thus, pursuant to this statute, a driver must signal to indicate a turn any 
time he “turn[s] a vehicle onto a highway.”  “There are no exceptions in I.C. § 49–
808 to the signal requirement.”  State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 666, 991 P.2d 
388, 391 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279, 954 P.2d 
1073, 1075 (Ct. App. 1988).)   
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In this case, the district court’s conclusion that Pettit was not required to 
signal at the intersection was primarily based upon two factors: (1) Pettit 
effectuated his turn from a right-turn-only lane; and (2) Pettit remained on 
Highway 95 South through the intersection.  (R., pp.134-143.)  The district court’s 
reliance on these factors was misplaced because the signal requirement of 
I.C. § 49–808(1) does not contain an exception for either circumstance. 
First, pursuant to the plain language of I.C. § 49–808(1), Pettit’s presence 
in a right-turn-only lane prior to his turn did not excuse his statutory duty to 
signal.   The district court’s contrary conclusion was based upon the fact that, in 
the court’s judgment, requiring a driver to signal in this circumstance “would not 
aid in promoting safety on the roadways” because signaling from a right-turn only 
lane would not benefit other drivers.  (R., pp.140-141.)  However, the plain 
language of I.C. § 49–808(1) does not contain any exception for turn-only lanes, 
nor does it provide that the signal requirement does not apply when a driver (or 
subsequently, a court) deems that signaling does not promote public safety in a 
particular circumstance.  Instead, the Idaho legislature expressly removed such a 
provision from the statute in 1977.  See Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 666, 991 P.2d at 
391 (rejecting Dewbre’s argument that I.C. § 49–808 does not require a driver to 
signal when entering or exiting a passing area, and noting that, prior to the 1977 
amendment, I.C. § 49–808 provided that an appropriate turn signal was only 
required “in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement,” but 
that this statute no longer contained this exception); see also 1953 Idaho Sess. 
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Law 507; 1977 Idaho Sess. Law 370.  The district court thus erred by essentially 
writing such an exception into the turn signal requirement of I.C. § 49–808(1). 
Numerous other jurisdictions have interpreted state statutes similar to I.C. 
§ 49–808(1) as requiring drivers to signal from turn-only lanes.  See e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“The 
statute requires use of a signal lamp or a hand signal when making a turn, and 
provides no exception for turns made from a lane designated for turns only.)”  
State v. Smith, 42 A.3d 845, 846-847 (N.H. 2012) (declining to find exception for 
turn made from left-turn-only lane where none existed in the statute); Wehring v. 
State, 276 S.W.3d 666, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“The plain language of the 
statute requires the driver to signal for a turn.  It does not include exceptions for 
those situations in which there is only one direction to turn.”); State v. Smith, 805 
N.E.2d 171, 172-173 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding that police had probable 
cause to stop the appellant because use of a signal was required when turning 
from a left-turn-only lane).  
Notably, at least two other jurisdictions which have interpreted statutory 
turn-signal requirements as containing an exception for turn-only lanes, have 
done so on grounds that would be inapplicable to a plain-language reading of I.C. 
§ 49–808(1) in Idaho.  In State v. Padilla, 850 P.2d 372, 372-373 (Or. Ct. App. 
1993), the Oregon Court of Appeals relied upon a prior Oregon case in which the 
Court opted for a “pragmatic” construction of the term “turn” as used in the 
relevant statute, and “refused to construe ‘turn’ literally, because that would 
create ‘absurd situations in which safety is not furthered.’”  (quoting State v. Bea, 
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810 P.2d 1328 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).)  While this is similar to the reasoning set 
forth by the district court in the present case, an Idaho court interpreting an 
unambiguous statute2 is not permitted to consider whether application of the 
literal, plain language of the statute would produce “absurd results.”  See Verska, 
151 Idaho at 894-896, 265 P.3d at 507-509.  In S.A.S. v. State, 884 So.2d 1167, 
1168-1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), the Florida District Court of Appeal held 
that a driver is not required to signal from a turn-only lane because the relevant 
state statute expressly requires a signal only when “any other vehicle may be 
affected by the movement.”  As discussed above, I.C. § 49–808(1) contains no 
such provision.   
The district court also erred by relying on the road naming conventions 
utilized at the relevant intersection in determining that Pettit did not “turn.”  The 
court reasoned that “Pettit did not ‘turn [his] vehicle onto a highway’ because he 
was already traveling on Highway 95.”  (R., p.139 (brackets in original).)  
However, the turn signal requirement of I.C. § 49–808(1) provides no exception 
for the occasion of when a road name remains the same through a turn.3  Just as 
the plain language of I.C. § 49–808(1) does not require a driver to signal at a 
                                            
2 In this case, the district court engaged in statutory construction and analyzed 
the legislative intent of I.C. § 49–808(1) despite deeming the statute 
unambiguous both with respect to the statutory interpretation issue (R., p.138), 
and in concluding that Sgt. Baldwin’s mistake of law was not objectively 
reasonable (R., p.144).  
 
3 Further, the name designation of the road did change after the intersection, at 
least in part.  Highway 95 South is also designated as Highway 8 prior to the 
intersection, and is additionally designated as South Jackson Street at some 
unspecified earlier point.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.2-11; p.20, Ls.14-22; R., p.132 n.1; 
Defendant’s Exhibit A.)  After the intersection, Highway 95 and Highway 8 split.  
(Defendant’s Exhibits A, B.)   
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point where a straight road happens to change names, I.C. § 49–808(1) likewise 
does not excuse a driver’s statutory duty to signal prior to a turn when the road 
name stays the same.  See Kelly v. State, 413 S.W.3d 164, 170-171 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2013) (holding that officer possessed reasonable suspicion that Kelly 
violated state statute requiring a driver to signal prior to a “turn” where Kelly 
“turned off the direct course of the road that he was on even though the name of 
the road did not change.”)   
Instead, Pettit “turn[ed]…onto” a highway pursuant to the plain language 
of I.C. § 49–808(1) because of numerous factors not adequately considered by 
the district court:  (1) several posted traffic signs indicated that a driver in Pettit’s 
lane was required to make a right turn (State’s Exhibits 4-7); (2) a green traffic 
arrow specifically required that a driver in Pettit’s lane is required to turn (State’s 
Exhibits 5-7; see also I.C. 49-802(1)(b)); (3) the physical characteristics of the 
road, which led Pettit from the right lane to a right turn through the intersection 
(Defendant’s Exhibits A, B; State’s Exhibit 3); and (4) the relationship between 
Highway 95 South and the other roads at the intersection, where a driver must 
choose the appropriate lane and then either turn left, go straight, or, as Pettit did, 
turn right.  (Defendant’s Exhibits A, B; State’s Exhibits 3-7.)   
For these reasons, the factual finding made by the magistrate court, and 
affirmed by the district court, that Pettit’s movement through the intersection did 
not constitute a “turn” onto a “highway” pursuant to I.C. § 49–808(1) was 
incorrect and unsupported by substantial evidence.  Further, the district court 
erred by relying on this erroneous factual finding to conclude that the plain 
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language of the signal requirement of I.C. § 49–808(1) did not require Pettit to 
signal prior to traveling through the intersection.  Likewise, the district court thus 
erred in concluding that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Pettit’s 
vehicle, and in affirming the magistrate court’s suppression order.  
 
II. 
Suppression of Evidence Is Not The Appropriate Remedy When The Statute 
Upon Which The Underlying Seizure Was Based Is Subsequently Declared 
Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To Him 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 In his motion to suppress, Pettit argued that I.C. § 49–808(1) was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and therefore, it could not serve as 
the basis for Sgt. Baldwin’s traffic stop.  (R., pp.35-39.)  While the district court 
did not reach this issue in affirming the magistrate court’s suppression order (R., 
pp.142-143), the state anticipates that Pettit will raise this issue again in this 
appeal.  This argument fails because, even assuming that I.C. § 49–808(1) was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pettit, suppression of evidence from the 
underlying DUI investigation would not be the appropriate remedy for such a 
conclusion.  Further, and in any event, the signal requirement of I.C. § 49–808(1) 
is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pettit and the circumstances of this 
case. 
 
B. When A Statute Upon Which A Fourth Amendment Seizure Is Based Is 
Subsequently Deemed Unconstitutional, Suppression Is Not The 
Appropriate Remedy  
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a constitutionally valid 
seizure is not rendered invalid by a subsequent determination that the law on 
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which the seizure was based is unconstitutionally vague.  See Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37-40 (1979);4 see also United States v. Dexter, 165 
F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1999) (“even if the statute was unconstitutional as 
applied, suppression would not be justified because Trooper Lewis reasonably 
relied on the statute when he determined that there was a violation.”). 
In DeFillippo, the defendant was arrested for violating a Detroit municipal 
ordinance providing that it was “unlawful for any person [suspected of criminal 
activity] to refuse to identify himself and produce evidence of his identity.”  Id. at 
33.  DeFillippo was charged with possession of a controlled substance recovered 
from a search incident to that arrest.  Id. at 34.  The trial court denied DeFillippo’s 
motion to suppress.  Id. at 34-35.  The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that since DeFillippo had been arrested under an unconstitutionally 
vague city ordinance, both the arrest and the search were invalid.  Id. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals 
and found, “On this record there was abundant probable cause to satisfy the 
constitutional prerequisite for an arrest.”  Id. at 37.  The Court noted that, at the 
time of DeFillippo’s arrest, “there was no controlling precedent that this ordinance 
was or was not constitutional, and hence the conduct observed violated a 
presumptively valid ordinance.”  Id.  “Police are charged to enforce laws until and 
unless they are declared unconstitutional.”  Id. at 38.  “Society would be ill-served 
                                            
4 As discussed below in Sec. III, the United States Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed and relied upon DeFillippo in concluding that where an officer makes 
an objectively reasonable mistake of law in conducting a traffic stop, the Fourth 
Amendment does not require the suppression of evidence that was obtained as a 
result of the stop.  Heien v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535-540 
(2014).     
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if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and 
which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.”  Id.  The Court concluded, 
“[t]he subsequently determined invalidity of the Detroit ordinance on vagueness 
grounds does not undermine the validity of the arrest made for violation of that 
ordinance, and the evidence discovered in the search of respondent should not 
have been suppressed.”  Id. at 40.   
The state recognizes that in Burton v. State of Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 149 
Idaho 746, 748-750, 240 P.3d 933, 935-937 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that I.C. § 49–808(1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
Burton and the circumstances of that case (specifically, whether a turn signal is 
required before one drives into a single lane that stems from the merger of two 
lanes).  However, the state submits that such a holding conflicts with the holding 
in DeFillippo.  Further, in Burton, the Court of Appeals did not expressly employ a 
Fourth Amendment analysis, or cite any authority standing for the proposition that 
the remedy for the statute’s vagueness was suppression of the evidence.  See id.   
A determination that I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague would 
warrant dismissal of a charge for failing to signal a lane change under that 
provision.  But under DeFillippo, for purposes of suppression, it is immaterial 
whether I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pettit.  
Therefore, even if I.C. § 49-808(1) was unconstitutionally vague in the 
circumstances of this case, such a finding would not undermine the validity of 
Sgt. Baldwin’s detention of Pettit.  Instead, Sgt. Baldwin had a constitutionally 
adequate basis to stop Pettit for violating I.C. § 49-808.   
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C. Idaho Code § 49–808(1) Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To 
Pettit And The Circumstances Of This Case 
 
“A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute 
or regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it 
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’”  F.C.C. v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).  Thus, “the void-for-
vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary 
and discriminatory prosecutions.”  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 411, 
(2010).   
Statutes, however, have a “strong presumption of validity” and the court 
must, if it can, “construe, not condemn” them.  Id. at 403 (internal quotes and 
cites omitted).  That “close cases can be envisioned” is insufficient to “render[] a 
statute vague” because the state must still prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 305-306 (2008).  Even if a 
statute’s “outermost boundaries” are “imprecise,” such uncertainty has “little 
relevance” if the “appellant’s conduct falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the 
statute’s proscriptions.”  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); see 
also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 411 (citing Broadrick).  Furthermore, sufficient clarity 
“may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute.”  United 
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).  “‘One to whose conduct a statute 
clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.’”  Alcohol 
Beverage Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944, 949, 231 P.3d 1041, 1046 (2010) 
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(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 495 n. 7 (1982) (internal quote omitted)). 
In this case, for similar reasons as discussed above in Sec. I regarding 
why Sgt. Baldwin had reasonable suspicion to stop Pettit, the signal requirement 
of I.C. § 49–808(1) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Petttit and the 
circumstances of this case.  The plain language of the statute required Pettit to 
signal prior to his right turn at the Highway 95/Highway 8 intersection, and did not 
contain any exceptions to that requirement for turn-only lanes, or for when a road 
name remains the same through the course of a turn.  
Burton, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held that I.C. § 49–808(1) was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton and the circumstances of that case, 
is distinguishable.  At issue in Burton was the provision of I.C. § 49–808(1) 
requiring a driver to signal prior to “mov[ing] a vehicle right or left upon a 
highway.”  Burton, 149 Idaho at 748-749, 240 P.3d at 935-936.  The Court of 
Appeals held that the statute did not provide fair notice “that a signal is required 
before one drives into a single lane that stems from the merger of two lanes.”  Id.   
As the Court noted, there was no “signage or other indicator that one lane was 
ending and the other surviving.”  Id. at 749, 240 P.3d at 936 (emphasis added).    
To the contrary, in the present case, there was ample signage and traffic 
signals informing Pettit that, to continue on Highway 95 South, he needed to be 
in the middle or right lane and then turn right.  (Tr., p.16, L.22 – p.20, L.7; State’s 
Exhibits 3-7.)  Prior to making this turn, Pettit was required to signal.  I.C. § 49–
808(1); see also State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881, 884-885, 341 P.3d 598, 601-602 
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(Ct. App. 2014) (distinguishing Burton and holding that I.C. § 49–808(1) was not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Colvin because a posted sign clearly 
indicated which lane was terminating); State v. Spies, 157 Idaho 269, 273-274, 
335 P.3d 609, 613-614 (Ct. App. 2014) (distinguishing Burton and holding that 
I.C. § 49–808(1) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Spies because 
the configuration of the road made it clear which lane was terminating).   
Even assuming that suppression is the appropriate remedy when the 
statute upon which a seizure is based is subsequently deemed unconstitutional, 
Pettit is still not entitled to suppression because the signal requirement of 
I.C. § 49–808(1) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him and the 
circumstances of this case. 
 
III. 
Even If Sgt. Baldwin Lacked Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Pettit’s Vehicle, This 
Mistake Of Law Was Objectively Reasonable, And Therefore, Suppression Is 
Unnecessary 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 As an alternative argument presented to the magistrate court in response 
to Pettit’s motion to suppress (R., pp.56), and to the district court in its 
intermediate appellate capacity (R., pp.98-99), the state argued that any mistake 
of law made by Sgt. Baldwin was objectively reasonable, and thus, suppression 
was not warranted under the Fourth Amendment.  Both the magistrate court and 
the district court rejected this argument.  (R., pp.143-145; Tr., p.64, L.18 – p.69, 
L.8.)  The district court concluded that there was no objectively reasonable 
mistake of law because the relevant provision of I.C. § 49–808(1) was clear and 
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unambiguous.  (R., pp.143-145.)  The district court erred in rejecting the state’s 
argument.   
Even assuming that I.C. § 49–808(1) did not require Pettit to signal prior to 
turning through the intersection, and that Sgt. Baldwin thus lacked reasonable 
suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop, Sgt. Baldwin’s mistake of law was 
objectively reasonable.  Therefore, the district court erred in rejecting this 
argument as set forth by the state, because suppression was not warranted.5 
 
B. If Sgt. Baldwin’s Interpretation Of I.C. § 49–808(1) Was Erroneous, This 
Was A Reasonable Mistake Of Law Which Does Not Require Suppression  
 
Whether an officer’s mistake of law will necessarily invalidate a traffic stop 
is an issue that has never been squarely addressed by Idaho’s appellate courts.  
See State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010) (declining to 
address whether mistake of law invalidated traffic stop because “mistake at issue 
was primarily one of fact”); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 (Ct. App. 
2008) (where officer’s alleged mistake of law did not cause Buell’s detention, 
authorities addressing the viability of detentions based on mistakes of law were 
“inapposite”); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(finding it unnecessary to “resolve whether a police officer’s mistake of law is 
unreasonable per se” because, even “allowing for reasonable mistakes of law by 
police,” there was “nothing in the record from which it might be concluded that 
the officer’s mistake was objectively reasonable”).   
                                            
5 Below, the district court did not distinguish between the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions with respect to this issue.  (See R., pp.143-145.)  On appeal, the 
state asserts that suppression is not warranted under either the United States or 
Idaho Constitutions. 
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Recently, however, in Heien v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 
530, 534-540 (2014), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether an officer’s mistake of law will necessarily invalidate a traffic stop under 
the Fourth Amendment.  In that case, an officer stopped Heien because the 
vehicle in which he was travelling did not have two properly functioning brake 
lights.  Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 534.  The officer subsequently recovered cocaine 
during a consensual search of the vehicle.  Id.  The trial court denied Heien’s 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search.  Id. at 535.  However, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the traffic stop was 
constitutionally invalid because N.C. Gen. St. § 20-129(g), the state statute upon 
which the stop was based, required only that vehicles have one properly 
functioning brake light.  Id.  The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals, holding that the officer “could have reasonably, even if 
mistakenly, read the vehicle code to require that both brake lights be in good 
working order,” and that when an officer “acts reasonably under the 
circumstances, he is not violating the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. (quoting State v. 
Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 356 (N.C. 2012).  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the 
decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court.  Id. at 534-540.  The Court 
reasoned: 
As the text [of the Fourth Amendment] indicates and we 
have repeatedly affirmed, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 
___, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (some internal 
quotation marks omitted).  To be reasonable is not to be perfect, 
and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the 
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part of government officials, giving them “fair leeway for enforcing 
the law in the community’s protection.”  Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).  
 
Id. at 536 (brackets added). 
 
The Supreme Court then noted its previous recognition that searches and 
seizures based upon mistakes of fact can be reasonable.  Id.  For example, the 
Court noted, the warrantless search of a home is reasonable if undertaken with 
the consent of a resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the consent of 
someone who reasonably appears to be but is not in fact a resident.  Id.  (citing 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–186 (1990).)  The Court found no 
distinction between this principle and reasonable mistakes of law:  
But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such 
mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable 
suspicion.  Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an 
officer’s understanding of the facts and his understanding of the 
relevant law.  The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either 
ground.  Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or 
the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: 
the facts are outside the scope of the law.  There is no reason, 
under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why 
this same result should be acceptable when reached by way of a 
reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a 
similarly reasonable mistake of law.  
 
Id. 
 
Further, the fact that a traffic stop need only be supported by reasonable 
suspicion and involves only a minimal intrusion on the privacy of the individual 
stopped differentiates this case from other cases in which the Idaho Supreme 
Court has declined to apply a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule 
under other circumstances.  See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 513-519, 272 
P.3d 483, 485-491 (2012); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 984-998, 842 P.2d 
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660, 663-677 (1992).  While providing citizens greater protections from 
warrantless searches of their person, homes, cars and other property may well 
be justified in light of the inherently invasive nature of such searches, the same 
concerns are not present when an officer, having an objectively reasonable 
(albeit mistaken) belief that a motorist has committed a traffic violation, briefly 
detains the motorist for the purpose of simply confirming or dispelling that 
suspicion.   
 In fact, requiring “law enforcement officers to accurately forecast how a 
reviewing court will interpret the substantive law at issue” is actually “inconsistent 
with the rationale underlying the reasonable suspicion doctrine.”  See Heien, 737 
S.E.2d at 357.  Both the United States Supreme Court and Idaho’s appellate 
courts have recognized that reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to any 
precise legal formula, but must instead be based on commonsense judgments 
considering the totality of all of the circumstances known to the officer.  E.g., 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 
690, 695 (1996); State v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 655, 262 P.3d 682, 684 (Ct. 
App. 2011).   
Finally, the United States Supreme Court also recognized that a rejection 
of the state’s argument regarding objectively reasonable mistakes of law would 
be “hard to reconcile” with its prior opinion in DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).  
Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 538.  DeFillippo, as discussed above in Sec. II, was seized 
for violating a statute which was subsequently deemed unconstitutionally vague.  
Id. (citing DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 33-35).  At the time DeFillippo was arrested, 
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however, “there was no controlling precedent that this ordinance was or was not 
constitutional, and hence the conduct observed violated a presumptively valid 
ordinance.”  Id. (citing DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37).  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
held, the officer still had probable cause to arrest DeFillippo at the time of the 
arrest, and the search that recovered contraband from his person was still 
constitutional.  Id. (citing DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37-38).        
 For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court should hold that, even if 
I.C. § 49–808(1) did not require Pettit to signal prior to traveling through the 
intersection, or even if the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
Pettit and the circumstances of this case, suppression of evidence is not 
warranted under the Fourth Amendment because Sgt. Baldwin’s mistake of law 
was objectively reasonable.   
 Like the challenged statutes in Heien and DeFillippo, I.C. § 49–808(1) has 
never been interpreted by Idaho appellate courts to answer the relevant 
questions of the underlying case – in this instance, whether a driver is required to 
signal from a turn-only lane, or when the name of the road remains the same 
through a turn.  Therefore, at the time of the arrest, Sgt. Baldwin acted 
reasonably in concluding that Pettit’s action of turning from a lane controlled by a 
sign and traffic signal, both of which expressly indicated that a right turn was 
required, was a “turn…onto a highway” pursuant to I.C. § 49–808(1).  Therefore, 
because any mistake of law was objectively reasonable, Pettit has failed to show 
that he is entitled to suppression. 
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Even assuming that I.C. § 49–808(1) did not require Pettit to signal prior to 
his right turn at the intersection, and that Sgt. Baldwin thus lacked reasonable 
suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop, Sgt. Baldwin’s mistake of law was 
objectively reasonable.  Therefore, the district court erred in rejecting this 
argument as set forth by the state below, because suppression was not 
warranted. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court’s 
appellate decision and the magistrate court’s order granting Pettit’s motion to 
suppress, and to remand for further proceedings.  
 DATED this 10th day of November, 2016. 
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      Deputy Attorney General 
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